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is surely one worth considering. As Kotze righdy points out (on p. 111) the
"choice of an électoral System is one of the most important aspects of the
consolidation of democracy in South Africa". ^
Overall, this book makes a useful contribution to the debate. The blind spot
on the part of many South Africans as to what is happening elsewhere on the
African continent is probably another legacy of the apartheid era. This book
shows that South Africans have much to learn from their neighbours ui the
choosing of their new électoral System.
JOHN HATCHARD
Journal of African Law, 41: 159-174




The phenomenon of ethnicity is being declared by many to be the cause of
au the problems of Africa, especially those of violent conflict. Some salient
examples are Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya. While in many cases ethnicity and
ethnic-based antagonisms have indeed been a factor in conflicts and have often
been suppressed within the structures of the post-colonial states (with their
seemingly sacrosanct boundaries), the political relevance of the phenomenon has
varied widely. In the political System and the laws of an African country, however,
ethnicity seldom received official récognition.2
Ethiopia is an exception. According to the policy of the EPRDF-led3 gov-
ernment (in power since 1991 and confirmed in a général élection of sorts in
May 1995) ethnie identity has been declared the ideological basis of political
organization and administration, and has also been enshrined in the Fédéral
Constitution of December 1994 defining the outlines of the new Ethiopia.4.
This article examines some aspects of the formal constitutional solution that
Ethiopia has offered to the problem of ethnie or ethno-regional tensions, in the
context of the country's recent historical developments. However, it does not go
into the practical aspects of its observance and its relation to the socio-political
or international context of Ethiopia, nor into the ideological controversies which
surround it.
First, a word about how ethnicity is understood in this article. Ethnicity cannot
be defined in an essentialist or narrow sensé5, but it is used here to refer to "a
cultural interprétation of descent and historical tradition by a group of people,
as opposed to others, and expressed in a certain behavioural or cultural style".
It could also be seen as a kind of "expanded, fictive kinship". Ethnicity is also
a variable quality in the cultural and historical identity of a human and it
occasionally overlaps with regional and political-economic différences. It is often
only one part of a person's or group's social identity, but is articulated in
situations of conflict such as conquest, incorporation or marginalization, and is
often consciously "appropriated" in a political sense by a collectivity. The
* African Studies Centre, Leiden.
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the Seminar on "Ethnicity, Politics and
Memory in Ethiopia: Some New Perspectives", held at the African Studies Centre, Leiden, in
November 1996. I am most grateful to Alessandro Triulzi and Stephen Elus for commenta. Final
editing was done in January 1997.
2 Cf. Claude Ake, "What is thé problem of ethnicity in Africa?", (1993) 22 Transition 1-14.
3 Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionär^ Democratie Front, the rebel guerrilla movement which ousted
Mengistu's communist dictatorship in 1991. lts core is the Tigray People's Liberation Front, a
movement founded in the mid~I970s in the northern région of Tigray.
4 This Constitution was ratified by the Constituent Assembly in December 1994 and became
official in August 1996. It was the fourth Ethiopian constitution promulgated for the last 65 years.
Another was drafted in 1974 in the early stages of the révolution, but it was ignored and shelved
by the Derg military council which took over power later that year. I have used the following text:
The Drafl Constitution of Ethiopia. A Drafl Approwd by the Council of Représentatives (an unofficial draft
translation from the Amharic), Addis Ababa: Constitutional Commission of Ethiopia. 1994.
5 Cf. Marcus Banks, Ethniaty: Anthnpolegwal Constructions, London, 1996, 10.
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historical memory and cultural identity which crystallize as part of an "ethnie
group" as a category of identification or as a movement to secure collective
interests, are important ingrédients which structure its social relations.
In contemporary Ethiopia thé discourse of ethnicity has become strongly
politicized, more so than ever before, and has created "realities" which did not
previously exist. Few of the parties concerned (libération movements which
emerged largely in the 1970s and largely "mono-ethnie" political parties dating
from the early 1990s) fully realize the artificial aspect of the matter or the
implications of their aspirations, especially when they are cast in the inévitable
and ubiquitous idiom of "national self-détermination". Neither do they recognize
the fact that Ethiopian government discourse on ethnicity, and its political
practice, is unduly influencing them by setting the terms of the national debate
and policy on ethnie relations and the political restructuring of the country.
This is not to say that ethnie rights are unimportant,6 or even that fédération
is a bad idea for Ethiopia; it is not. But the striking fact is that the often newly
created and delineated "ethnie identity" of groups is assumed to be a reflection
of a primordial group character, of a group as a "natura!" unit in which people
of a multi-ethnic state have to live. This is, however, very questionable. Often
an ethnie revival is primarily a result of failing state policy, which excludes
certain ethno-regional groups, and of a political strategy of aspiring but blocked
elite groups produced by the national educational System in a situation of
economie stagnation. As a result of economie problems—limited resources and
insignificant overall growth—this problem is quite common in Africa. Although
other countries like South Africa and Rwanda up to 1994 gave ethnicity a
measure of official récognition, Ethiopia is different in the sensé that ethnie
identity is the normative identity on the basis of which the new state prefers to
deal with its citizens in many sphères of life, especially the political and economie.
For élection registration, for example, people have to state their ethnie identity.
The second key term of this article is constitutionalism, here seen as "... the
legally defined limits on the power of the majority or on the sovereign state in
any form (monarch, president or single party)". These limits are in some sense
self-imposed7 by the polity, in a process of debate and compromise. The function
of a constitution is first to protect individual rights of citizens, and secondly to
restrain or prevent certain (usually threatening) political changes which a majority
or a self-declared sovereign power would simply impose on a minority,8 that is,
it is to make authorities answerable to the law.
CONTINUITIES IN PAST AND PRESENT "ExHNIC lOENTITIES"
Political developments in present-day Ethiopia also raise questions about the
rôle and représentation of ethnicity in the history and culture of Ethiopia at this
juncture. In this context I briefly address the question of past and present forms
of ethnicity, before moving to the discussion of the constitution.
6 Nevertheless, the concept of "ethnie rights" is legally speaking still very unclear and not very
useful (cf. Adeno Addis, "Individualism, communitarianism, and the rights of ethnie minorities",
(1993) 67 Notre Dame law Rem» 619.
7 Cf. Jon Eister, "Introduction", in J. Eister and R. Slagstad (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democrcuy,
Cambridge, 1988, 2.
0 Ibid., 3.
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Social scientists are sceptical about thé presumed primordial character of
ethnie identity and its alleged long history, because it is so fluid and subject to
change and manipulation, and also of its cultural content and core symbols.
(This is a familiär argument since thé work of Hobsbawm and Ranger on thé
"invention of tradition" in 1983 and the many field studies of anthropologists.)
The contemporary language of ethnicity is usually a political language in disguise.
One might ask, for instance, in what sense historical ethnie identities in thé
Ethiopia of today are re-surfacing or re-created. Do they show a continuity with
past forms of social organization? How has thé expansion of the Ethiopian state
since its ideological reaffirmation of "national political unity" under Emperor
Tewodros (1855-68) and in particular since thé, in many respects, violent process
of incorporation under Emperor Minilik II (in the last decade of the 19th Century)
shaped the expérience of groups since, and has this led them into the present?
I will briefly touch upon this issue, which may be relevant to the question of
whether there is a meaningful continuity between past modes of governance and
cultural autonomy of the various ethnie groups and the recent constitutional re-
arrangements which define their polity. This question is of course relevant to an
assessment of the future prospects of the Ethiopian fédération.
Référence to the values of traditional cultures of nations, nationalities and
peoples in the programmes and ideological proposais of ethno-nationalist leaders
is often surprisingly thin. The only domain where this is being realized is in
éducation: children are now taught in their "native language", and Amharic,
the lingua franca, is one subject among others which can be chosen.
I will mention only two cases where this issue of cultural continuity can be
seen, or is thought to be, relevant. Most often mentioned in the recent literature
is the case of the Oromo people, the largest ethnie group or nation in Ethiopia,
with a long and rieh historical tradition. Their age-grading and generation-set
System called gaadaa is a case in point.9 Particularly the Guji and the Boran-
Oromo still practise it to this day, though most other Oromo groups abandoned
it during their development of indigenous states (the Ghibe région kingdoms) in
the 19th Century and during the process of partial intégration into a wider
Ethiopian highland society. The intricate system of government represented by
the gaadaa is grafted on an agro-pastoral way of life and its observance as an
organizing political principle is susceptible to changes in social scale, economie
life and external contacts. It will not work in a stratified society with economically
specialized groups, such as in modern society. Most observers, including Baxter
and Bassi, suggest that gaadaa nowadays serves mainly as a symbol of Oromo
political ethos and achievement, as well as an illustration that there were
traditional constitutional limits on the exercise of power. There are other éléments
in the Oromo political tradition which could be more directly accommodated
in a new political system of fédéral government: the respect for the oral
law (seerd) and, more importantly, the democratie assembly system—collective
9 Cf. Marco Bassi, "Power's ambiguity or the political significance of Goda", in P.T.W. Baxter,
J. Hultin and A. Triulzi (eds.), Being and Becommg and Oromo. His/arical and Anthmpological Inquiries,
Uppsala, 1995, 177f. Also Paul Baxter, "The création and constitution of Oromo nationalily", in
K. Fukui and j. Markakis (eds.), Et/micify and Conflict in the Hom ofAßica, London, 1994, 167-186.
Other relevant examples would be the Sidama (hand) age-grade system, the traditional "sacred" or
"divine" kingships in southern Omotic-speaking régions of Ethiopia (Maale, Wolayta or Gofa), the
system of clan-elders and religious leaders among the Somali, or the Dizi councils of chiefs and
elders. They all contains core éléments of an indigenous "rule of law" system, whereby people have
basic individual rights, next to Community rights.
and (jonsimavmaiism m jc.tmopia
meetings (guumï) aimed at consensus (and which probably formed an integral
part of the political system, in close association with the gaadaa).1® Lewis11 has
called the political orientation and organization of decision-making through
assemblies and élection of leaders with specialized work functions among the
Oromo as "republican". There are as yet few studies of how such structures
articulate with the modern structures put in place under the Derg or under the
new regime.
About this aspect more can be said on the basis of a second and very similar
case, that of the "acephalous"12 agro-pastoral societies like Mursi, Me'en and
Surma in southern Ethiopia (where fieldwork has been carried out over the past
few years). These small-scale societies have a system of political decision-making
through a reigning age-set, Community elders and ritual leaders. Décisions are
also achieved in structured public debates, aimed at majority opinions and
common action. The Surma, for example, constitute a society of about 28,000
people where no ethno-nationalist stirrings have occurred, but which, along
which other rural groups in the South, has long been marginalized. Under the
ethnie self-rule ideology of the new regional organization, a so-called Surma
Council has been installed with 11 elected members. It consists of young people,
often ex-soldiers who know Amharic, the national working language. The work
of the Surma Council tends to bypass the traditional arena of political decision-
making located in the above-mentioned Surma assemblies and public debates,
because they are seen as irrelevant to the programme which the state wants to be
implemented. For the state, "democratization" does mean "ethnie représentation"
and working through ethnie elites, but not necessarily autonomous grass-roots
decision-making.
It must be said that this ethnie model has given the Surma at least a voice
within the political structure: even though they are co-opted into a state structure
where they have little influence, they have seats in the regional and "zonal"
administration (a quota of three people), and are even represented (with one
appointed deputy) in the national parliament, the House of People's Rep-
résentatives. But if participatory local administration within the Surma com-
munity, public debate, consensus-building and thé ritual confirmation of collective
décisions are neglected, thé Surma will remain an unstable element. This partly
dépends on which people are going to fill thé position of chairmen in thé
"peasant-associations" which thé Zonal government intends to install among thé
Surma. If the elders and traditional leaders are barred from exercising influence,
another field of tension will be built up. The new stratum of young Surma
leaders will not be able to enforce government policy, except by dividing thé
Community.
These examples reveal once again that customary models and organizing
principles from thé ethnie past cannot and will not be accepted by the state as
a direct basis for present-day political reconstruction, despite claims to thé
contrary. They will largely disappear in thé new structures. The 1994 Constitution
does not contain a structural and recognized place for such models and idéologies
pertinent to an ethnie group/nationality. The actual régional policy so far shows
10 See Bassi, loc. cit.
1 ' Cf. Herbert L. Lewis, "Deniocracy and Oromo political culture", (1995} 7 Life and Peace Rtmew
26.
12 In thé sensé of more démocratie, non-centralized societies without a strong executive power
and characterized by more structural equality in collective decision-making.
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even less concern with the "common culture, bond, identity, consciousness and
territory" with which thé "nations, nationalities and peoples" are defined in thé
Constitution (see below). Perhaps in thé case of people not seriously exposed to
modernizing political and économie influences of the past decades, like the
, Surma or thé Boran, such traditional structures may be maintained for longer,
but not, for examplc, among thé majority of thé Oromo or Gedeo or Kaficho
who are farmers and traders.
In thé emerging ethno-national movements and political parties, traditions of
political organization, customary law and cultural autonomy provide éléments
of a value System and a fund of collective memory and identity which cannot
be denied. As Paul Baxter has said in a study of the Oromo movement, "values
drawn from the past do, nevertheless, hâve contemporary relevance and a hold
on ail our imaginations, for better or for worse".13 The core point emerging
from a study of past or pre-modern forms of political and social organization
among "ethnie groups" which remained outside thé sphère of the Ethiopian
central state is that they usually had principles on thé limitation of absolute
power, which we would now call constitutional.
Because of the past struggle against the Derg dictatorship for more autonomy
and récognition of rights and thé current discourse of ethnie identity, there is
no going back to past narratives of unity. But an intégral part of thèse collective
memories is that of thé historiés of inter-group contacts, cxchange and mutual
influences within state structures. Thèse hâve to be institutionally and con-
stitutionally acknowledged.
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE RESURGENCE OF ETHNICITY
The question of how thé ethnie héritage can be "translated" into political
arrangements is a fundamental problem, with constitutional aspects. If one
answers "autonomy or independence", thé question arises, in what form? That
it must be a Western-style parliamentary democracy with élections and a multi-
party system may seem logical but only to external Western observers. A spécifie
problem in thé Ethiopian context is that every régional state now so designated
under thé fédéral arrangement is multi-ethnic, even Tigray (where Saho and
Kunama as well as Amhara, Oromo and other minorities live with Tigray
people). None of the nine régional states is mono-ethnie,14 so the protection of
"minority rights" is needed also in thé future constitutions of such states. The
problem for a fédération "linkingheterogeneous groups in a process of institutional
dialogue",15 is thereby just deflected towards another arena, a lower level, where
thé sarne problems of what thé démocratie exercise of rights means and how it
can be guaranteed, corne bouncing back. The spur to conflict of interests and
identities has been the expansion of central state power in Minilik's time,
Consolidated under the centralizing rule of Haile Selassie, framed in a narrative
of modernity, development and authoritarian control.
" Baxter, op. cit., 183.
14 See the recent 1994 Census reports on thé various regional states of Ethiopia, published by
thé Central Statistical Authority, Addis Ababa, 1995-1996.
11 Cf. Adeno, op. cit., 621.
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The 1994 Constitution thus intends to present a model restoring the fédéral
tendency inherent in Ethiopia's geo-political character,16 but ils explicit re-
instatement of ethnicity in law cornes in a politico-économie situation which has
made ethno-regional groups more interdependent than ever before, and where
the central state has corne to play an essential rôle as a resource and a mechanism
of redistribution.
If historical or ethnie group identities do not show a direct continuity with
the past, and if the current phase of political mobilization of ethnicity is not a
direct or "logical conséquence" of past exploitation and repression, as is often
asserted by the elite spokesmen (mosdy living in exile) of the ethnie groups, a
direct return to models of the ethnie héritage for social and political purposes
cannot be envisaged as a solution to redress current problems in the context of
a state.17 On thé assumption that the state is still a desired mechanism to realize
rights of a collectivity and of individuals, all ethno-regional/ethnic libération
movements (many of them represented at the National Conference in Addis
Ababa in 1991, organized by thé EPRDF) share the view that a state form of
organization is useful, either as a vehicle for resources or to realize one's own
ambitions of autonomy, democracy and development in a new ethno-region.
CURRENT ETHIOPIAN REALITIES AFTER THE DEMISE OF THE NARRATIVE OF
UNITY
The Derg régime in Ethiopia crumbled because of centrifugal régional tend-
encies, but perhaps more so because of violent, authoritarian rule stifling thé
exercise of démocratie rights which ultimately undermined thé whole social
fabric. Post-Mengistu Ethiopia is marked by a discourse of diversity, ethnie
identification, and even confusion and fragmentation. The old national narrative
of "unity in diversity" under Haile Selassie and "unity from diversity" under
Mengistu, clad in thé symbolism of respectively a national religion (Orthodox
Christianity) and a historical process of a brightly unfolding socialist future
(Marxist communism), is gone for good. But instead, a workable political formula
to deal with thé héritage and the memories of diversity and autonomous polity
(19th-century kingdoms or chiefdoms from Maale to Kafa, from Jimma to
Gojjam) has not yet been formed, unless one accepts thé narrative of "national
self-détermination" and its ethno-nationalist elaborations. At présent, despite five
years of expérimentation in Ethiopia, thé idea of self-détermination is, for many
observers, still little more than a slogan, an ideology which has not received a
workable political solution.
We know thé actual ethnie diversity in Ethiopia, and the enduring problems
of ethno-regional disparities in éducation, infrastructure, development and rep-
résentation in leading administrative positions at the level of the central state.
Both thé large Oromo population and thé many minority groups in Ethiopia, if
looked at proportionally, were underrepresented in ail major domains. Many
groups which were incorporated or conquered by Minilik II in the late 19th
Century remained marginal to thé polity, thé economy and thé exercise of
16 During most of its history Ethiopia was de facto a kind of fédéral country, where the power of
the monarch was often superficial and remote, and régional autonomy substantial. See Christopher
Glapham, "Constitutions and governance in Ethiopian political history", paper for thé Symposium
"The Making of thé New Ethiopian Constitution", May 1993. Addis Ababa: Inter-Africa Group.
17 Cf. Baxter, op. cit., 183.
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administration. This was often conditioned by their geographical remoteness
from thé centre, for example, as a malaria! lowland and a border area without
roads and few interesting economie resources to harness. In view of the diversity
of régions and ethnicity it is nevertheless remarkable how little of the fighting
in thé period of Haile Selassie and the Derg has been systematically against
other ethnie groups as such, or because of "ethnie problems" and suppression.
For instance, if any group had any reason to fight thé central government it
would be thé Arssi Oromo,'8 violently subdued by Minilik and kept in check by
Haile Selassie. But thé Arssi did not mobilize an armed struggle against thé
régime. The ultimately successful revolt came from a core Abyssinian area of
thé empire, Tigray, which had always had a large amount of autonomy and
leverage. Also, its people were not against spécifie "ethnie groups"19 as such, but
primarily against unjust and dictatorial rule which happened to corne from
Shewa. But thé violent suppression of the Derg in later years ultimately also
targeted thé cultural identity of people: forbidding thé use of their own languages
and thé organization of significant cultural ceremonies (initiations, age-group
assemblies, religions rites) contrary to the "spirit of socialism" led to ethnie or
ethno-regional mobilization.
In thé various rebellions emerging just before and after thé Ethiopian révolution
of 1974, Marxism was the leading ideology. The formula of "national self-
détermination" of thé various oppressed nationalities of Ethiopia was part of its
discourse.20 The EPRDF came to power in 1991 using this ideological tenet,
rooted in its struggle for Tigrayan autonomy. The idea of "national self-
détermination" can be seen as thé second major ingrédient of the revolutionary
ideology of thé Ethiopian revolutionary student opposition, and it became
prominent öfter the démise of the socialist narrative which emphasized class-
analysis, as presented by the leftist Ethiopian movements MEISONE and EPRP,
movements which lost the struggle for power in the 1970s to the military Derg
dictatorship. The Derg subsequentiy adopted a rigid and dogmatic version of
this socialist ideology, relating all nationality questions to class questions and to
a future socialist order in which such problems would dissolve. The EPRDF in
fact is executing the second phase of the Ethiopian révolution with its emphasis
on "national self-détermination".21
The problem is, however, that the concept itself is much less populär now
than in the 1970s and 1980s. Given the recent problems in, for example, Bosnia,
Mexico, the former Soviet Union, India, or the Philippines, one is inclined to
conclude with Eric Hobsbawm, in his monumental history of the 20th Century,22
that "national self-détermination" is an idea whose time is past. In addition,
from a legal view point, it is also clear that it is not a straightforward concept
(as many self-appointed ethno-nationalist elites claim). Constitutional lawyer
18 See Abbas Haji, L'Etal et les Crises d'Intégration Nationale en Ethiopie Contemporaine, Talence/
Bordeaux, 1993.
19 The word as such in Amharic (behéreseb) did not even exist before the early 1980s, when
Mengistu's neo-Stalinist idéologues introduced it during their work for the Institute for the Study of
Ethiopian Nationalities.
20 As expounded in a famous 1969 article by Walleligne Mekonnen in a student opposition paper
(Challenge) in the Haile Selassie years, cf. Kiflu Tadesse, 77« Generation. The History of the Ethiopian
Peofles' Revolutionär? Party. Part I: From the Early Begimings to 1975, Silver Spring 1993, 53-54.
21 The TPLF long had as its ideological core the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, of which
Ethiopia's present leaders were members. It is not know whether this League still formally exists.
22 E.Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, London, 1995, 567.
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Alan Buchanan23 has made a case for the view that "self-determinalion" is always
a multidimmsianal goal, thus a "qualified right" and not a "moral right" at all
times and circumstances.
THE TRANSLATION OF ETHNICITY: A LOOK AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAUSES ON NATIONALITY RIGHTS
Since 21 August, 1995, Ethiopia has been no longer a unitary but a fédéral
state. The new Council of People's Représentatives was installed and thé new
fédéral arrangement was officially proclaimed, with as its basis the December
1994 Constitution (which, incidentally, was only gazetted in December 1996).24
Below are outlines of the main constitutional principles regarding ethnie or
"nationality" rights and the judicial order, and some of their implications. It is
to be noted that thé Constitution drafters (consciously or not) have made an
effort to link it with principles outlined in thé African Charter of Human and
People's Rights, adopted in 1983. This underlines community rights (second and
third génération rights) next to thé individual human rights which were seen by
many Africans as based too closely on libéral Western ideas.25 The main clauses
of thé Ethiopian Constitution, which make it certainly a very original document,
refer to ethnicity and thé fédéral order.
Sovereignty has been given to thé "nations, nationalities and peoples" of the
country (Article 8.1). This is potentially a very large number, although no list is
given (only for thé 45 groups in thé Southern région, in Article 47.1, footnote).26
Thèse three terms are seen as équivalent and defined as communities having thé
following characteristics: "people having a common culture reflecting considérable
uniformity or similarity of custom, a common language, belief in a common
bond and identity, and a common consciousness thé majority of whom live
within a common territory" (sic) (Article 39.5). This définition is questionable,
and it contains contradictory éléments. Not all groups identifying themselves as
a community do so on the basis of all these criteria, only on a number of them,
and some groups may primarily refer to territorial, économie, religious or even
a sub-ethnic clan identification (which allies them with people from another
"ethnie group"). For the actual delineation of the group, the Constitution drafters
appear to have taken the linguistic criterion as décisive (as did thé Institute for
thé Study of Ethiopian Nationalities in 1983). But there will be uncertainty in
thé future about thé extent and nature of such groups, even apart from the
reluctance of people to be always identified on the basis of ethnicity.27
Interestingly, this sub-article on définition cornes only five articles after thé
opening one (Article 39.1) which starts by giving the "nations, nationalities and
peoples" (even before one knows who/what they are) their "... unrestricted
23 Allen E.Buchanan, "The right to self-détermination: analytical and moral foundations", (1991)
8 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 41-50.
24 The Constitution was published on 12 December, 1996, with thé imprint "21 August 1995"
(the date of the inauguration of thé fédéral Republic of Ethiopia) in VoLl, No. l of the new Fédéral
Negaril Gazeta, which replaced 54 years of thé Negant Gazeta, set up by Emperor Haile Selassie I.
Vol. 1, No. 1 of thé Fédéral Negant Gazeta thus appeared after about 40 subséquent issues were already
published. The reason for thé delay is not known.
25 With good reason, see Buchanan, op.cit., 45.
26 In thé Constitution, 51 groups are mentioned if those contained in the names of the other
member states are included.
27 This "over-ethnic view" of people may, incidentally, be a serious bias in Western perceptions
(and also within Africanist studies) of African societies.
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right to self détermination up to sécession". This principle of sécession is a left-
over from the socialist-communist thinking referred to above, and is an extrême
form of thé "right to national self-détermination". Furthermore, as defined in
thé Constitution, it has problematic aspects. The right has nat been given to thé
nine rnember states of thé fédération (they are not the "sovereign units"), but
instead to thé "nations, nationalities and peoples" in thé member states of the
fédération (in Article 47.2). So this means that they (thé "nations, nationalities
and peoples") can secede from thé fédération and from thé member state.28 This
may have been designed to counteract actual sécession. It is also a constitutional
anomaly that thé right to secede is given to radier badly defined units (the
"nations, nationalities and peoples").29 However, to seek a solution to this problem
by asking30 for a clear définition of the ethnie groups which are sovereign and
which can be accorded thé right to sécession is a mistake. Except perhaps in
thé case of Région 9 (thé small Harari city-state, created probably to "protect"
thé 50,000 Harari people in thé midst of other, mainly Oromo, groups), actual
social reality shows that ethnicity cannot be ordained on straightforward or fixed
criteria. People shift allegiances according to perceived political and économie
opportunities or to religious and cultural affinities. That is why the référence to
"ethnie identity" of citizens is best left out of a Constitution as a structural
principle.
There is no overlap between member states, and "nations, nationalities and
peoples", and thus there arises a confusion to what thé real sovereign units are
and how many can claim their separate status. In practice, there have been
various attempts to solve this in the past two years, such as by creating more
and more "spécial districts" (called in Amharic liyyu woreda) within thé member
states, carved out along "ethnie" unes within a larger région (for example Konso
woreda, thé Surma woreda) which become relatively autonomous enclaves in a
member state. This has already had the effect that many groups now claim such
a status, which may complicate administrative levels further.
A final interesting aspect of thé reflection of ethnicity in thé Constitution is
that of a bypassing of the constituency voting System outlined briefly in Article
54, by some "minority nationalities and peoples": they were given a représentative
in thé Council of People's Représentatives (parliament) without élections. In
subséquent législation, 22 such groups were given such a free seat, ail with a
population of under 100,000 (which is the size of a constituency). "Minority
nationality" is again a new term, cross-cutting the earlier division into nations,
nationalities and peoples, and member states, supposedly also based on ethnie
criteria.31
The actual division of fédéral powers between member states and fédéral
government (as defined in thé Constitution) is "not fédéral enough". As stated
in Article 52.1—2, member states can enact fédéral législation and can organize
their own state political structures. But thé clauses make it clear that thé states
hâve no rôle in debating policies and in proposing législation formulated at, or
with an impact on, thé fédéral level. Most fédéral Systems give thé member states
28 See the short but very perceptive paper by Flora Goudappel and Maarten Oosterhagen,
"Ethnicity, federalism and development: constitutional solutions for Ethiopia?" Rotterdam, Erasmus
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more power of this kind; examples are Germany, Canada, Mexico, Nigeria.
Goudappel and Oosterhagen32 are correct in noting that there is no fédéral
System of checks and balances in the Ethiopia model, to the detriment of the
power of the member states.
The text also says (Article 50.9) that the fédéral government "may" delegate
"some of its [many] powers" to the member states but not that it must, or that
in the future it will do so. Also, states may delegate some of their powers and
responsibilities to the fédéral government. The latter means that the central
government can, with the proper "organizational opérations" (the local terni
used), interfère almost as it pleases in regional state affaire. This has happened,
for instance, in 1995 when the trouble-spot Dire Dawa was taken out of the
Somali regional state and declared a separate région, direcdy administered under
the fédéral government.
Another rôle of the member states is in the second (least important) chamber
of the Parliament, the Council of the Fédération. The members of this Council
are chosen (delegated) by the nine member states, but the influence of die
member states is minimal. The Council itself has limited powers: it can only
"settle disputes" between member states, interpret and contribute to amending
the Constitution. A Constitutional Court or Constitutional Inquiry Commission,
announced in Article 82, was installed in July 1996. By serving under the rather
impotent Council of the Fédération it cannot maintain a sufficiendy independent
rôle. It may have received nominal judicial power in Article 84.1 (though
supervised by the Council), but it still remains a non-judicial institution.33 lts
power therefore amounts to little if one realizes how the Council is dominated
by the fédéral Executive power (Prime Minister and Council of Ministers). Six
of die eleven members of this Constitutional Inquiry Commission are chosen
from the Council of the Fédération, and five are politica! appointments, close
to the Prime Minister.
Goudappel and Oosterhagen3* have rightly emphasized that the member states
have few real powers to take care of their own internai affairs. If a member state
has to be given powers (by decentralization and dévolution) in the domain which
warrants its existence, it has to be able to carry out its work. But the member
states have not been given those powers: in practice there is no real subsicüarity
(that is, the principle of letting policies be carried out by government organs
which can do them best). The underlying problem is that the very basis on
which the states have been defined is shaky: the prime criterion has been ethnicity
and language. So this means that they are apparenüy considered to be the best
entities to deal with matters like language policy, cultural policy and the éducation
System. But for the devising and implementing of the practical economie,
infrastructural or development tasks, the present-day regional states may not be
the most effective units. (The record of many regional states so far indeed bears
diis out.) In order to enhance the rôle of the member states in die present
situation, the Council of die Fédération should constitutionally be given real
controlling and legislative fonctions, more like diose of the main parliamentary
32 Ibid., 3.
33 See Aberra Jembere, "The fonctions and development of parliament in Ethiopia", in G.M.
Zoethout et ai. (eds.), Constitutionalism inAftica. The Questfor Auttmamous Prmciples, Deventer, 1996, 82.
34 Op. cit., 3-4.
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body, the Council of People's Représentatives, although even this does not have
the right to initiate législation.
The economie structuring of regional autonomy and decentralization to the
states (pardy contained in Article 51(1,2,6,9,11); see also Articles 77 and 89 on
"economie objectives", 97, 98 and 100-102 on taxation powers) suggest, in
combination with the législation which has subsequendy been issued,35 that the
central state intends to maintain a large extent of control over taxation and fiscal
policy in die regional states, even the final say (as was the case in the 1991-94
period of transition).36 The clause of "self-determination" is ambivalent also in
the economie sense, perhaps pardy because of the weak economie basis of the
individual member states, especiaUy the smaller ones which are hardly viable.
Various other economie phenomena such as transhumant pastoralism, border
trekking and labour migration (which were always very common in Ethiopia)
are not accounted for in the scheme of diings. If strictly enforced, the prevention
of such activities will probably resuit in local conflicts over resources as well as
the exclusion of people who used to migrate.
Again one gets the impression that "self-determination" was granted for
rhetorical and ideological purposes, and that there seems to be no intention of
the central fédéral government to relinquish real power (apart even from the
question of the economie and administrative capatity of the present régions to go
it alone). This inbuilt problem of resource allocation will lead to disputes. It may
not be a problem for the smaller, dependent states, but may incite elite
groups in the larger regional states not to seek compromise and integrative
accommodation, but to go for sécession all the more ardently.37
Land rights are an issue with a hearing on ethnicity. In Article 40.3, the
Constitution has declared public (that is, state) ownership of land and natura!
resources (trees, wells and so on): they are said to be "... the common property
of die nations, nationalities andpeoples of Ethiopia". This means that individuals
are declared perpétuai tenants of the state. While perhaps laudable in its intention
of trying to prevent inequality and the émergence of a new landed class and a
landless prolétariat, this clause has two main drawbacks: it perpétuâtes tiie
unlawful confiscation of all private land (without compensation) by the Derg
regime and créâtes an ultimate feeling of insecurity among the rural population,
and it will inhibit long-term Investments. (This does not mean that the government
cannot and does not exécute policies aimed at the improvement of productivity
and at development, such as through extension schemes, better transport facilities,
large-scale distribution of fertiliser and improved seeds.) The déclaration of all
land as state-owned may, in addition, subvert the rights of ethnie groups/
communities to possess and utilize their own ancestral lands, with which diey
often have a relatively harmonious relation of "stewardship" (the Konso, die
Hamar, the Dizi) as well as a strong cultural and ritual bond. The land can also
be appropriated without restrictions for fédéral purposes like mining or hydro-
electric projects.
35 Cf. John M. Cohen, '"Ethnie federalism' in Ethiopia", (1995) 2 (N.S.) Northeast Afiican Studies
172-74.
36 See Eshetu Chole, "Opening Pandora's box: preliminary notes on fiscal décentralisation in
contemporary Ethiopia", (1994) l (N.S.) Northeast Ajncan Studies 7-30.
37 See Paul H. Brietzke, "Ethiopia's 'leap in the dark': federalism and self-determination in the
new Constitution", [1995] 39 JÄ.L. 32.
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In terms of national surplus extraction (such as for exports), the land issue
may become a major one especially in the Oromia région, the largest and most
productive area (most of the major exports come from there: coffee, gold, hides
and skins). Ethno-nationalist groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front see
here a central government ploy to exploit the region's resources "for its own
benefit", not ploughing the profits back into the région for development purposes.
There is an absence of judicial review of the courts over the state executive
and legislative powers in order to check their actions and possible infringements
on individual and group rights. Judicial review is of course essential ultimately
to safeguard human rights (enumerated in Articles 13-44 and 89-92).30 Neither
are there possibilities of independent constitutional amendaient. Amendments
can be made by proper (though very difficult) procedure in the Council of
People's Représentatives (Articles 93, 105.2) but in view of its dependence on
the executive and the lack of a power of initiative to propose an amendment,
this action will be inhibited. For instance, the Gonstitutional Court which is
formaüy under the Fédéral Council has five of its members appointed by the
Prime Minister and six members (most likely selected through party channels)
delegated from the regional state governments and is thus not fully independent.
It would have been better to make the Constitutional Court a part of the
Suprême Court (which is less in the orbit of politics) and to have this body
invested with constitutional review powers.
When reading the Constitution it is also notable how far the proclaimed text
is removed from the actual practice of the political culture and social relations
in Ethiopia. First, Ethiopians have always conducted their lives and regulated
their disputes according to customary law and will continue to do so. In Chapter
9, the Constitution does not mention customary law jurisdiction; this is the
domain of the 1960 Civil Code (still valid). On the basis of the Civil Code,
Article 3347(1), customary law is indeed partially retained in court jurisdiction.
But its relation to codified state law (mainly relating to the Christian-religious
and monarchical tradition), which in Ethiopia has been weE-developed since the
Middle Ages, is tenuous. The mass of the population did not know this tradition
very well, except in the Christian highlands.
Secondly, one cannot establish an independent judiciary by decree (as in
Article 78.1). The Ethiopian justice and court System was well-developed in so'me
areas, but has always been susceptible to corruption at the lower levels (of
province and district) and to political pressure at the higher levels. It will remain
so, although strenuous efforts are made to exterminate it. The judiciary is still
not independent, certainly not after the wholesale replacement of all experienced
judges of the courts in the past two years by ill-trained youngsters.
The problcm of the independence and observance of the judicial power is
connected to that of its relation with the legislative and the executive powers.
Some observers (like Goudappel and Oosterhagen, Henze39 and Aberra40) have
already noted that in the définition of this relationship the balance is tilled
strongly towards the executive. The latter is itself invested with many legislative
and judicial powers, or with powers to influence the two other branches. This
Jö Aberra Jembere, op. cit., 88.
39 Paul B. Henze, "Comment« on the Ethiopian Draft Constitution of 1994", Washington, D.C.,
unpublished paper.
40 Aberra, op. cit.
reflects on the fédéral arrangement of ethno-regional power-sharing, mentioned
above.
Reading the draft Constitution, there is no doubt where the real power lies:
with the executive, that is, the Prime Minister (behind him his political party)
and Council of Ministers. The Council of People's Représentatives does not
even have the right of initiative. Interviews with members of this Council confirm
the interprétation that all the political dynamics émanâtes from the side of the
executive. Council members do speak and offer criticism, but not independently.
At all times they have to mind their language. As was evident in the past (first)
year of session (even from the CounciTs annual review presented in August this
year by the House speaker), many members are inexperienced and intimidated.
They do not even bring up pressing problems which may exist in their con-
stituencies, certainly not when they concern violent conflict.
There remains a problem in the relation betwecn the first génération rights
(elementary human rights), the second génération rights (social and cultural
rights) and the special third génération rights as vested in the nations, nationalities
and peoples of Ethiopia. If the first two sets of rights are properly respected and
maintained, the third set does seem a bit superfluous. During the discussion of
the Constitution in the Constitutional Assembly on 8 December, 1994, there
seemed to be a tendency to equate "human and democratie rights" with the
rights of "peoples, nations and nationalities to self-détermination".*' But, as
Henze noted: "the resolution of conflicts between individual rights and ethnie
pressures, including the protection of individuals within 'nations, nationalities and
peoples' is not specificaUy considered".42 While a catalogue of first génération
human rights is enumerated in Chapter 3 (Articles 13 to 27)43 of the Constitution,
their relation to the nationality rights (Articles 39, 47) could have been clearer.
In a political sense, the latter may tend to overshadow the former. This problem
will eventually present itself in any of the nine member states in the fédération,
because they all have their own minorities.
A final problem which encapsulâtes many of the foregoing critical points is
the following. While the Ethiopian Constitution has recognized "ethnie rights"
in one form or another, even if the outlines of this concept remain ambiguous
and legally fuzzy,44 it has not addressed the présence of the "non-ethnic"
population in Ethiopia: not only do the large group of persons with "mixed
origin" parents not have a structural place in the order of things, also the growing
urban population is left out. What are the urbanités, what is their identity?45
The Constitution has tried to answer this by declaring Addis Ababa, the largest
urban centre with at least three million inhabitants, a special, chartered territory,
with "complete powers of self-administration", but detached from the ethno-
federal order (Article 49.1-5). But it is not only Addis Ababa that has a large,
41 Cf. the state newspaper Etkiopian Herald, 9 December, 1996, 1.
42 Henze, op. cit., 3.
41 Art. 24 is a novel one, stating (24.1) "the right to human dignity and good réputation", and
(24.2) "the right to freely develop his personality in a manner consistent with the rights of others".
44 Cf. Adeno, op. cit., 619, 622.
45 This problem was already implicit in the ethnie map of the Derg regime, drawn up in 1984
by the (Government) Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, and discussed byj. Bureau,
"A propos de l'inventaire des nationalities éthiopiennes", in G. Lepage et al. (eds.), Eludes Ethiopiennes,
Actes de la Xe Confirmes Internationale des Etudes Ethiopiennes, Pans, 24-28 août 1988, Paris, 1994, Vol.l,
501-511. In fact, a lot of work of delineating "nationalities" by the Derg was without much change
taken over by the EPRDF regime after 1991, showing an underlying common point of view derived
from Marxist views on the "national question".
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mixed population, including people who will never return to their "ethnie areas
of origin", but also other towns like Shashemene, Awasa, Jimma or Asella. Thèse
people (numbering millions) hâve by implication been declared "non-existent",
non-ethnie. The resuit in actual practice is that local ethnie groups to whom thé
région nominally belongs, or those who are a majority group in thé région where
thèse cities are located, are trying to assert their dominance on local affairs. For
instance, in Awasa, a large town in thé Southern Région, thé Sidama (who are
over-represented in thé zonal administration) claim the town as part of their
territory, although it was not traditionally theirs, and try with ail means (often
surreptitiously) to expand their numbers in thé town. This local dominance
would also mean that thé Sidama language would hâve to be taught in thé
schools, pushing out Amharic, the national working language used until now in
the mixed urban areas. For all such problems there are no obvious solutions.
CONCLUSIONS
Ethiopia's Prime Minister is reported to have said last year, in a talk with a
constitutional scholar, that he did not really know where Ethiopia was going.
This reflects a commendable openness of mind, but perhaps also an underlying
confusion about a process which may have lost a clear direction. The Constitution
did apparently not offer an adequate framework for national co-operation and
cohésion.
No doubt the constitutional shaping of ethnicity in Ethiopia has been un-
precedented and daring. It is a formidable and in many ways exciting challenge,
perhaps with far-reaching lessons for poly-ethnic countries in Africa as a whole.
However, in view of thé dissenting voices on both thé Constitution and thé
putting in place of démocratie structures by thé présent régime, and in thé light
of thé peculiarities in thé actual Constitution, sketched above, it seems that thé
challenge is not yet met in a satisfactory way. It is not only that, like thé three
other constitutions before it, thé 1994 one serves, "to consolidate the power of
those who already held it" (as Clapham puts it).46 More importantly, thé
Constitution has tried to reify, to freeze something which is by nature fluid and
shifting: ethnie identity. That language has been declared as one of its main
defining characteristics is also highly debatable.
Nor has thé Constitution solved thé problem of reconciling thé various
générations of rights. The list of third génération rights goes far, probably too
far, in acknowledging a "right to sécession" as an extrême interprétation of
"national self-détermination". No other constitution of a democratie country has
a clause stating this right, and no constitutional lawyer or commentator47 can
be found who would endorse this principle, even if they are positively disposed
toward thé régime issuing thé constitution. Ethiopia is spécial, but not so special
that such a principle is needed. Henze states that "thé concept of sécession has
no validity as a feature or requirement of démocratie governance".48 Furthermore,
as shown above, thé Constitution does not take it seriously, because it retains
all real power at the state level. This ambivalent formula will in itself encourage
a radicalization of demands for separatism of ethno-regions or "nationalities",
46 See Clapham, op. cit., 5.
47 Cf. Brietzke, op. cit., 34-35; or Henze, op. cit., 4-5.
48 Henze, op. cit., 4.
once they realize that thé government is not serious about it. It would have been
better to give real fédéral autonomy and maintain an institutionalized structure
of intégration- and compromise-politics on thé national level. There is no doubt
that thé Constitution will sooner or later have to be amended in this respect.49
The actual implementation of thé fédéral order as defined dépends very much
on a rapid and effective dévolution of powers and on a phénoménal capacity-
building in thé "régional states". In view of what was said above and of the
persistent stories in thé Ethiopian press and thé internai government assessment
reports, there hovers a big question mark over the enterprise. The régional states
of Béni Shangul-Gumuz, Somali, Afar and Gambela especially have been
dismal failures, as indeed the central government has admitted, and show thé
unworkability of the structure. Also in this respect, thé constitutional définition
of thé rights and thé authority of thé fédéral units vis-à-vis thé central government
will have to be amended.
An underlying failure of thé Constitution and thé fédéral structure is that the
Ethiopian polity is not defined as, or designed as, an arena of compromise or
issue politics. In this respect, Constitutionalism is of course an underdeveloped
field in Ethiopia. It is, purposely or not, set on thé further strengthening of
ethnicity as a political identity and as thé vessel for "démocratie rights".
Interestingly, in this respect thé Ethiopian political model shows that a country
can be post-modem without having gone through a successful modem phase (it has
no shared idea of thé national state "project", no solid industrial society, no
mass consumption, no média culture, and so on). It is post-modem in its casting
out of grand narratives (as shown above), its emphasizing multiple identifies,
and its encouraging relativist commitments and partisan attitudes in people's
identifications. But while this fits in with thé global discourse on multi-culturalism
and thé "equality" of values and cultures, it is debatable whether it was ever the
preferred option of thé Ethiopian "toiling masses", in whose name the present
regime and its predecessor alleged to have assumed power. Historical memories
of exploitation and violent inclusion do exist among them, and they rightfully
want a récognition of the dramatic events that have befallen them in the past
Century. But such a récognition does not necessarily subvert the need and
possibUity for a country-wide démocratie polity (based on elementary individual
rights). In addition, in thé "pre-constitutional" law which existed within thé
various ethno-cultural traditions, ethnie identity as such was not a prédominant
principle.
Hence, in view of the underdeveloped political culture of debate and com-
promise among both thé government and thé various self-styled "libération
movements" and opposition parties, thé cultivation of ethnicity as thé political
language is very problematic. Most élites of the ethno-regional groups now
carved out seem to want to grab political power regardless of the conséquences.
They hâve no solutions to deal in an efficient and institutional way with thé
"minorities" in their own midst. In this, they bypass traditional mechanisms of
debate, alliance and réconciliation which were characteristic of the ethnie groups
until very recently and partially still exist (such as thé Somali-Amhara s»
49 The Constitution drafters have taken the extreme interprétation of "self-détermination", i.e.
they followed the "Nationalist Principle" (cf. Buchanan, op. cit., 46), without having sufficiently
studied and weighed thé various other options in this field: autonomous Community structure (as in
Spain), cultural autonomy, régional autonomy, self-government, etc.
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institution, the Oromo guwni assemblies, the inter-ethnic ritual ("traditional")
reconciliation-meetings between ethnie groups in the Maji or any other south-
western area). If one looks at the possibility of grounding the fédéral-démocratie
order in new administrative structures, there are points in especially the Oromo
politica! tradition (important because of its size and its "republican" nature) but
also in that of others like the Kaficho, the Sidarna and the pastoral peoples of
the south and west, with which connections can be made, as they have these
strong éléments of a politica! culture of egalitarian consensus-building which cuts
across "ethnie boundaries". This basis should be built upon in the actual
implementation of the fédéral decentralized structure. Only then can a
real "voluntary union of peoples, etc."—a declared aim of the EPRDF
government—be established.
To conclude: of course, the issue of recognizing ethnie diversity in a poly-
ethnic polity like Ethiopia deserves much attention. The present government
has made a serious effort, although its societal and institutional basis for
constitution-making, and for decision-making in genera!, has been slim. There
is no going back to a unitary state structure in Ethiopia which denies ethno-
regional différences and rights, or which Iets one group dominate the state. The
formula of ethnicization (although in a different, more effective, fédéral form)
should perhaps be encouraged if, first, it is generally interpreted and implemented
as libération and democratization; secondly, it is sustained also in the domain
of respecting individual human rights within the ethno-regions; thirdly, it works in
the economie domain: and finally, it is a tendency and a frame of mind accepted
by the "rural masses", the majority. If, however, all this does not happen and if
the ethnie emphasis combined with economie problems would instead lead to
ethnocentrism, regional economie disparities and a reproduction of inequalities
on the intermediate leve! of the new ethno-regional states, then one wonders
what is new, and whether the Ethiopian people have won anything yet by the
constitutional récognition of their being ethnically separate.
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THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE




It is matter for debate whether there has been an évolution of médical
malpractice law in South Africa, as the term implies progressive change and
many would argue that South African law in this regard has changed very little
over a long time. There have been changes in médical law, such as the
development of the doctrine of informed consent, where there has been a shift
from an overtly paternalistic approach in terras of which the patiënt was expected
to make a choice based on the information (if any) that the doctor chose to
reveal, to the current position that the patiënt is an autonomous subject and
therefore is entitled to be fully informed and, on the basis of that information,
to make the final choice regarding treatment.
With regard to the law of médical négligence, the issue invariably turns on
the court's interprétation of the concept of "the reasonable doctor". When one
realizes that the action of the doctor under scratiny will be judged against that
of his or her colleagues, then it could be argued that the standard is ultimately
decided by the doctors, and not the judges. However, in a growing number of
décisions the courts have stressed that although they will be guided by the
opinions of other médical practitioners considering the merits or demerits of a
défendant doctor's behaviour, it is the court and not the médical profession that
is the final arbiter. Whether in practice this means that the judiciary, rather
than the médical profession, décide the outcome is a questionable proposition,
as in the field of médiane judges are invariably laypersons, and would therefore
rely heavily on the opinions of expert witnesses drawn from the ranks of the
médical profession.
With the enactment of the Constitution, and its emphasis on individual rights,
it might be expected that things will change. It is difficult to see on what basis
this could be so, as the test of négligence is primarily a factual matter, with
questions of policy being more concerned with the existence of a duty of care,
rather than the content of that standard, namely the duty of care expected of a
reasonable doctor.
However, the Constitution has created expectations amongst South African
citizens, and one of these expectations is that the provision of médical care
should be construed as a fondamental right. Increasing numbers of people are
presenting themselves at state hospitals and demanding treatment. Increased
pressure on the hospita! System will mean that staff and equipment will often be
overworked and under stress. More mistakes will be made. There will be more
matters before the courts. It is to be hoped that this will enable the courts to
evolve the law with regard to the test of reasonableness as they did with the
question of informed consent. The law of médical négligence could develop from
a series of décisions based on the factual question of whether a doctor was
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